USA v. D\u27Amario by unknown
2008 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-10-2008 
USA v. D'Amario 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. D'Amario" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 1466. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1466 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1BLD-88 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4134
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
ARTHUR D'AMARIO,
                      Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00112)
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 20, 2007
Before:    MCKEE, RENDELL AND SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Opinion filed: March 10, 2008)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
2After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Arthur D’Amario was found guilty of threatening to murder a United States Judge in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).  His counseled post-trial motions, including a Rule
33 motion for a new trial, were denied.  Also, D’Amario submitted several pro se
documents in District Court, including memoranda in support of a Rule 33 motion for a
new trial, a motion for release, a motion for sanctions, and letters.  The District Court
denied the pro se motions and twice ordered D’Amario to cease and desist from filing any
further pro se motions because he was represented by counsel. On March 26, 2007,
D’Amario was sentenced to eighty-four months of imprisonment.  Counsel filed a direct
appeal, which is currently pending in this Court at C.A. No. 07-1955.
D’Amario then filed another pro se Rule 33 motion for a new trial, suggesting that
the scope of counsel’s duties regarding his representation on direct appeal did not
encompass a post-trial Rule 33 motion.  By order entered April 27, 2007, the District
Court rejected D’Amario’s arguments and denied the motion, specifically noting that the
contentions may well be raised in the pending direct appeal, and that the scope of
counsel’s duties includes Rule 33 motions.  D’Amario then filed a motion for leave to file
a pro se Rule 33 motion for a new trial and a motion for release pending the decision on
his Rule 33 motion.  On May 8, 2007, the District Court denied the motions and again
ordered D’Amario to cease and desist from filing any further pro se motions.  Acting pro
se, D’Amario appealed these orders and sought summary remand for the District Court to
3consider the merits of his Rule 33 motion.  This Court affirmed the District Court by
order entered December 5, 2007 (C.A. No. 07-2477).
Meanwhile, D’Amario continued to submit pro se filings to the District Court,
including a motion requesting the District Court to vacate the order restricting his post-
trial pro se filings; to assign new counsel located in Denver, Colorado; to grant a new
trial; and to grant immediate release.  On October 10, 2007, the District Court denied the
motions and again ordered D’Amario to cease and desist from filing any further pro se
motions.  As in its previous orders, the District Court noted that it would consider
motions filed by counsel only.
D’Amario now appeals pro se the October 10, 2007 order.  He has filed a motion
for bail, to which the government has filed a response in opposition.  D’Amario has also
filed a memorandum in support of summary reversal of the District Court’s order.
We have reviewed the record.  As with D’Amario’s pro se appeal in C.A. No. 07-
2477, we conclude here that the District Court acted within its authority to issue
limitations on D’Amario’s pro se filings submitted while represented by counsel.  See
United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 206 n.17 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting general rule on appeal regarding
pro se arguments made by counseled parties)).  The Constitution does not confer a right to
proceed simultaneously by counsel and pro se, and the District Court was not obligated to
consider D’Amario’s pro se motions in light of his being represented by counsel on direct
 We note that D’Amario also attempted to file a motion for bail in his pro se1
appeal in C.A. No. 07-2477.  On August 28, 2007, the Clerk of this Court refused to
consider that motion and referred the motion to D’Amario’s counsel on direct appeal. 
The Clerk’s order correctly noted that the Court does not permit “hybrid” representation. 
D’Amario is confined based on the judgment being challenged in his direct appeal, and
counsel is responsible for the decision-making in prosecuting that appeal–including
whether to file a motion for bail pending the outcome of that appeal.
   4
appeal.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (no constitutional right to
hybrid representation).  Moreover, D’Amario’s goal in seeking a new trial, as in his direct
appeal, is to challenge his conviction and sentence.  The possibility that D’Amario might
obtain relief via direct appeal further validates the District Court’s refusal to consider his
pro se submissions when he has a counseled direct appeal pending.  Cf. Kapral v. United
States, 166 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 1999) (commencement of an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 while direct appeal is pending is generally inappropriate); Womack v. United
States, 395 F.2d 630, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (a District Court may consider a section 2255
motion only in “extraordinary circumstances” when a direct appeal is pending).
Because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, see I.O.P. 10.6, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  D’Amario’s motion for bail is denied.  1
To the extent that D’Amario’s memorandum in support of summary remand may be
construed as a motion for summary action, the motion is denied.
